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COMMENTS
PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN
CYBERSPACE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL BOUNDARY
OF MINIMUM CONTACTS
LIMITED TO A WEB SITE
I.

INTRODUCTION

The issue of personal jurisdiction becomes more significant as the
Internet becomes available to more people around the globe.1 In the
past, the Internet was primarily used for accessing information. 2 Now,
1. Richard Raysman & Peter Brown, Resolving Jurisdictionand Venue Issues on the
Internet, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 1996, at 3. The Internet has grown rapidly in recent years,
causing an enlarged body of Internet jurisprudence. Id. Disputes that once existed only in
traditional commerce are now cropping up throughout the world as a result of on-line interaction. Id. The parties in these disputes have only had contact over the Internet, a place
without physical boundaries. Id. Because of the "boundaryless" nature of the Internet and
on-line disputes between parties, two critical issues have surfaced. Id. "First, to what extent is it possible to enforce laws against a defendant residing beyond a court's territorial
boundaries, based on conduct which takes place on-line? Second, where should a plaintiff
sue when it claims its rights have been violated in cyberspace?" Id.
2. Barbara Kantrowitz & Adam Rogers, The Birth of the Internet, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 8,
1994, at 56. The mid to the late 1960's introduced the beginnings of the Internet. Id. A
group of computer scientists were creating the first network sponsered by the Department
of Defense's Advanced Research Project Agency ("ARPA"). Id. Under the project name
ARPANET, the project's objective was to create a system that would allow researchers from
different areas to share ideas through computers. Id. At the time, computers could only
communicate with each other through the use of magnetic strips or punched cards. Id.
Computer Scientists wanted to make computers more efficient by connecting them into
networks and pushed for an experimental network that would link them to scientists
across the country. Kantrowitz & Rogers, supra at 57.
In 1968, J.C.R. Licklider and Robert Taylor published a paper that suggested that computers could be used as communication tools. Id. They pushed for an experimental network and began by linking four locations: UCLA, University of California, Santa Barbara,
the Stanford Research Institution, and the University of Utah. Id. The first network site,
or node as it is commonly called, was established at UCLA in September 1968. Id. The
first demonstration took place on November 21, 1968 when the scientists gathered to watch
their computer hook up with the computer at Stanford located hundreds of miles away. Id.
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as the Internet has 4developed, 3 the Internet has become a means for
business advertising.
Businesses often use their trademark or copyrighted work to advertise on the Internet. While many businesses advertise on a city or state
level, once a business places its intellectual property on the Internet, it
opens itself to liability5 on a global level. 6 World-wide exposure has
at 57. By 1971, there were almost two dozen sites, including sites at Harvard and MIT.
Kantrowitz & Rogers, supra at 57. In three years time, sixty-two sites had been created
and by 1981, there were over two hundred. Id.
Lawrence Roberts is credited with much of the development of the network. Id. One of
his tasks was to get unwilling scientists to participate in the network. Id. It caught on
quickly, as did electronic mail and on-line debate and conversation. Id. By the early 70's, a
new challenge arose in that other countries wanted to join. Kantrowitz & Rogers, supra at
58. They needed to create a way to link up networks around the world. Id. Vint Cerf, a
professor at Stanford, and Robert Kahn, from ARPA, developed a set of standards, known
as protocols, that could be used by multiple networks. Id. During the next decade, new
networks were created, including USENET news groups. Id. In the late 80's, as computers
became cheaper and easier to use, anyone with a modem could get on-line. Id. At that
time, the National Science Foundation established a network, the NSFNET. Kantrowitz &
Rogers, supra at 58. The NSFNET stands as the technical backbone of the Internet in the
United States. Id. With its job completed, ARPANET went out of commission in 1990. Id.
3. William J. Cook, FourInternetJurisdictionCases Break Rule of Thumb, Cm. LAw.,
Oct. 1996, at 77. The author discusses the rapid changes the Internet has made since 1994
in growth and the results this growth has played on personal jurisdiction by the increased
aggressiveness of intellectual property owners on the Internet. Id. Specifically, today's
Internet world exhibits a 49-million-member Internet community that includes 90,173 networks. Id. See Larry Krumenaker, Surveyors of Cyberspace, INTERNET WORLD, June 1996,
at 70 (discussing the statistics of the Internet). A survey taken semi-annually found that
129 countries currently have "direct connectivity" to the Internet, which is an increase of 39
countries since the last survey. Id. "A copy of the most recent survey letter (of the Internet] is available at http:/www.mids.org/ids2/ids2.504." Id.
4. Dennis F. Hernandez & David May, PersonalJurisdictionand the Net: Does Your
Web Site Subject You to the Laws of Every State in the Union?, L.A. DAIY J., July 15, 1996,
at 5. "The World Wide Web, a component of the Internet, is a cheap and relatively simple
medium for advertising and communications with a global audience." Id. A business can
advertise with its own Web site for $50 a month and be accessible to potentially 25 million
Internet users. Id. See MARTIN MooRE, THE INTERNET UNLEASHED: THE FturuRE OF THE

INTERNET 34-35 (1st ed. 1994). Many businesses use the Internet to sell and advertise their
products. Id. An Internet user is able to look at or read about the product and then order it
electronically. Id. Some businesses even have Internet accounts available to their consumers. Id. Furthermore, businesses also sell their product through Internet Service Providers such as CompuServe, Prodigy, and America Online. Id. See infra note 48 for further
information on Internet Service Providers.
5. Eric D. Suben, IntellectualProperty On-Line, 43 APR FED. LAw. 22, 22 (1996) (analyzing the changes personal computers have made in how we communicate, and the potential liability that arises in the array of intellectual property displayed on the Internet).
6. Jeff Weingart, JumpingJurisdictionalHurdles, CONN. L. Tam., Oct. 7, 1996, at 13.
Until recently, many businesses from different areas of the country may not have been
aware of each other. Id. However, because of the Internet, these businesses have been
able to rapidly expand their reach throughout the world. Id. Therefore, it is natural to see

1997]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE

forced intellectual property owners to become more aggressive in defending their rights 7 because intellectual property rights are easily violated
over the Internet.8 Thus, businesses advertising on the Internet should
seriously consider the potential problems involved before establishing
themselves on the Internet. 9
A problem the judicial system has dealt with for generations is how
to maintain an individual's right to due process while exercising personal
jurisdiction. 10 This problem has become more difficult since the Internet
easily and frequently enables millions of individuals to reach others on a
global level. 1 The judicial system must now consider either applying
conflicts arise from Internet related cases involving intellectual property. Id. Suben, supra
note 5, at 22. The risks of publishing globally may expose a business advertising with their
Web site to potential law suits around the world. Id.
7. Cook, supra note 3, at 77 (discussing the aggressiveness of intellectual property
owners to protect their intellectual property rights due to the Internet's rapid growth).
8. Alan Brill, A Lawyer's Place In Cyberspace,Am. LAw., Dec., 1995, at 10. One of the
many legal problems on the Internet is jurisdictional. Id. Because of the millions of computer connections around the world that are linked to the Internet, it is very easy to cross
jurisdictional boundaries on the Internet. Id.
9. Weingart, supra note 6, at 13. Internet related intellectual property cases, like all
cases, must be able to meet personal jurisdiction over the defendant in order to pursue
their substantive claims. Id. However, it can be difficult to establish personal jurisdiction
when the defendants only contact has been over the Internet. Id. Thus, intellectual property owners who establish their intellectual property on a Web site "should not be taken
any less seriously than rolling out a more traditional international advertising campaign."
Id. Furthermore, intellectual property owners who maintain a Web site should ensure that
their intellectual property displayed on the Web site does not infringe on third parties intellectual property rights. Id.
10. Michael W. Kier, Todd Shipyards Corp. v. CunardLine, Ltd.: ProceduralDue Process and an Arbitrator'sPunitive DamageAward, 42 CASE W. RES. 1085, 1094 (1992). The
Supreme Court Justices recognize the dynamic nature of the due process concept. Id.
"Like other constitutional principles, due process is shaped and defined by societal values
which are constantly evolving and which reflect the vitality of ever-changing circumstances." Id. See Tom Stacy & Kim Dayton, Rethinking Harmless ConstitutionalError,88
COLUM. L. REV. 79, 101 (1988). "The purpose of the due process right would be to ensure
reliable factual determinations, to guard against prosecutorial overreaching, and to ensure
that charging decisions conform to the community's fundamental sense of justice." Id.
BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990) (defining procedural due process). Procedural
due process is defined from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution,
which provides the right of life, liberty and property. Id. "Minimal procedural due process
is that parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard and, in order that
they may enjoy that right, they must be notified." Id. "Man, when perfected, is the best of
animals, but when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all." ISIDORE STARR,
JUSTICE: DUE PROCESS OF LAw 209 (1981) (quoting Aristotle from Plato's book, The
Republic).
11. Richard S. Zembek, Jurisdictionand the Internet: Fundamental Fairness in the
Networked World of Cyberspace, 6 ALs. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 339, 347-48 (1996). "When an
Internet user injures a person through cyberspace, the question becomes where the injured
person may recover from the Internet user in a manner that comports with due process
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or redefining the due

The major concern of the courts must be the potential

effects of imposing personal jurisdiction on a nonresident defendant
whose contacts are limited to the Internet.
One example that displays the framework and limits of due process
on the Internet is found in the Sixth Circuit's recent reversal of CompuServe v. Patterson.i 4 Other examples are the alarming decisions of
Inset v. Instruction' 5 and Maritz v. Cybergoldi 6 where the courts strayed
from the CompuServe due process analysis. Potentially, the Inset and
Maritz decisions could affect the development of the Internet.
This comment discusses the limits of personal jurisdiction arising
from cyberspace contacts by concentrating on four areas. First, this comment establishes the framework of traditional personal jurisdiction. Second, this comment examines how the courts are integrating cyberspace
contacts with the personal jurisdiction framework. Third, this comment
analyzes a standard to provide the constitutional limits of cyberspace
contacts integrated with personal jurisdiction, and applies that standard
to current case law. Fourth, this comment considers the potential effects
of decisions made by the judicial system involving cyberspace contacts
and proposes a standard by applying the personal jurisdiction framework to cyberspace contacts.

limitations. Or stated less abstractly, the inquiry is: which court may assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant?" Id.
12. Zembeck, supra note 11, at 380, concludes that the traditional framework of personal jurisdiction and due process limitations can effectively apply to the cyberspace regime. Furthermore, "[a]s courts and lawyers further understand cyberspace
communication, a coherent body ofjurisdictional jurisprudence will rapidly develop. Until
that time, existing paradigms ensure fundamental fairness in the networked communication medium of cyberspace." Id. at 380-81.
13. See Kier, supra note 10, at 1094 (discussing societies effects on how due process is
defined).
14. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing the U.S.
District Court's decision holding that Patterson's minimum contacts with the state of Ohio
satisfies due process).
15. Inset Systems, Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that a Web site that advertises purposefully avails the defendant to the forum state and
satisfies minimum contacts).
16. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding
that personal jurisdiction is proper when the minimum contacts are limited to a Web site
that advertises a service that is not yet available and creates a mailing list for the future
service).
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II. BACKGROUND
A.

THE FRAMEWORK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION

In order to apply personal jurisdiction to cyberspace contacts, it is
necessary to establish the traditional framework of personal jurisdiction.
A court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident may either
be general 17 or specific,' 8 however, the limits of due process are more
likely reached by specific jurisdiction. 19
Specific jurisdiction for an out-of-state defendant is satisfied by a
two pronged test. 20 First, the defendant must be susceptible to the fo-

rum state's long-arm statute. 2 1 The primary purpose of the long-arm
statute is to reach out-of-state and bring a nonresident defendant into
the state to defend a lawsuit.22 Second, when the long-arm statute is
17. JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL PROCEDURE ExAMPLs AND EXPLANATION 5 (2d ed.
1992). General jurisdiction is jurisdiction that arises when the defendant has substantial
in-state contacts. Id. The substantial contacts will allow a defendant to be sued for any
claim, even claims that are unrelated to the substantial activities of the defendant in the
forum. Id. Furthermore, general jurisdiction is found when the defendant's activities are
so "substantial and continuous" within the forum, that the defendant would expect subjection to any suit and not be at any inconvenience to defend the suit within the forum. Id. at
7. See Zembek, supra note 11, at 349 (discussing that all Internet related actions would
meet due process limitations if the defendant's activities fell under general jurisdiction requirements of substantial presence within the forum).
18. GLANNON, supra note 17, at 5. Specific jurisdiction is jurisdiction that arises out of
a single act by the defendant, and is jurisdiction that extends to the limits of minimum
contacts. Id. See infra notes 26-36 and accompanying text discussing the requirements for
minimum contacts test.
19. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1115 (6th Cir.
1994) (discussing that personal jurisdiction can be either general or specific, depending
upon the type of contacts the defendant has made with the forum state).
20. Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1115. "Acourt, therefore, must satisfy a two-pronged test: the
defendant must be amenable to suit under the forum state's long-arm statute and the due
process requirements of the Constitution must be met." Id.
21. Id.
22. GLANNON, supra note 17, at 26. In addition to the limitations of due process, the
long-arm statute gives authority to state courts to exercise jurisdiction over an out-of-state
defendant based primarily upon the defendant's contact with the forum state. Id. at 24.
The model for the state long-arm statute is based from the Enumerated Act. Id. at 25. The
Enumerated Act has served as a long-arm statute model for the majority of the states, and
defines personal jurisdiction based upon conduct. Id. The Enumerated Act states:
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by
an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from the person's
(1) transacting any business in this state;
(2) contracting to supply services or thing in this state;
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state;
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state
if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered, in this state; [or]
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state; or
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successful, the due process requirements under the Constitution 23 must
be satisfied.

24

Due process requires the defendant to have minimum contacts with
the forum state.25 The minimum contacts test requires three elements
for finding personal jurisdiction. 2 6 First, the defendant must have purposefully availed himself to the forum state.2 7 Specifically, purposeful
availment is found when the defendant's action is purposefully directed
towards the forum state and shows a substantial connection with the
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state
at the time of contracting.
UNIORM INTERSTATE AND INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE Aar § 1.03, 13 U.L.A. 355 (WEST

1986).
Although the primary purpose of the long-arm statute is to reach out-of-state and bring a
nonresident defendant into the state to defend a lawsuit, it is necessary to be careful not to
assume that every assertion of long-arm jurisdiction meets the constitutional requirements
of due process. GLANNON, supra note 17, at 25-26. Furthermore, "[aill long-arm statutes
that base personal jurisdiction on specific minimum contacts require that the claim sued
upon arise out of the contact itself." Id. at 26.
23. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Id.
24. Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1115.
25. See International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (establishing the
standard for minimum contacts to meet the requirement of personal jurisdiction for due
process). International Shoe, a shoe corporation with its business principally in Missouri,
had one of their agents working in Washington State. Id. at 312-13. The case arises from
the State of Washington denying International Shoe's agent recovery of contributions
under the Unemployment Compensation Act. Id. International Shoe's agent, during the
years from 1937 to 1940, employed thirteen salesmen who each lived in Washington, whose
business activities were confined within the state. Id. at 313. International Shoe sued the
State of Washington, and Washington State claimed the suit infringed upon the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 312. The Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court's judgment in favor of International Shoe by examining what constitutes substantial activities to establish minimum contacts when the defendant is not present within
the state. Id. at 316. The Supreme Court held that International Shoe's agent had substantial activities within the State of Washington which satisfied minimum contacts and
due process. Id. at 321.
26. Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1116. The courts have established a three-part test for minimum contacts to determine whether specific jurisdiction may be exercised:
First, the defendant must purposefully avail himself of the privilege of acting in
the forum state or causing a consequence in the forum state. Second, the cause of
action must arise from the defendant's activities [in the forum state]. Finally, the
acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have a substantial enough connection with the forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendant reasonable.
Id.
27. Id. "Jurisdiction is proper under the purposeful availment requirement where the
contacts proximately result form actions by the defendant himself that create a substantial
connection with the forum state." Id.
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forum state. 28
Second, the claim must arise from the defendant's activities with the
forum state. 2 9 If the defendant's contacts with the forum state are not
related to the controversy, then the minimum contacts analysis fails, and
30
the plaintiffs action cannot stand.
Third, the court's exercise of jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant must be reasonable.3 1 The factors for determining reasonableness
are as follows: the burden that is placed on the defendant;3 2 the forum
state's interest in the outcome; 3 3 the interests of the plaintiff in obtaining relief;34 the most efficient resolution due to the interstate judicial
the furthering of any social policies that are
system's interest;3 5 and, 36
shared among the states.
When all three factors of the minimum contacts analysis are satisfied, then due process is also satisfied.3 7 A court then may exercise per28. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,475 (1985). The court reasoned that
when the purposeful availment requirement is satisfied, the defendant is protected from
being brought into court "as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts." Id.
When there is a substantial connection with the forum state, or when the defendant deliberately is involved with significant activities, or has created continuing obligations with
residents of the forum state, then there has been purposeful availment with the forum,
such that the defendant "should reasonably anticipate being haled into court there." Id. at
475-76. However, the court will not find substantial activities for purposeful availment if
the activity is unilateral. Id. at 474. Furthermore, because of the substantial changes in
technology and commercial life, through the substantial use of mailings and wire communications across state lines, the presence of the defendant's activities within the forum state
is not necessary for purposeful availment. Id. at 476.
29. Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1116. "The cause of action must arise from the defendant's
activities" towards the forum state. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. "The acts of the defendant or consequences caused by the defendant must have
a substantial enough connection with the forum to make the exercise of jurisdiction over
the defendant reasonable." Id. Thus, a court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant must comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1117. See also World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
293 (1980). Furthermore, due process has been relaxed due to the change in commercial
transactions and technology, which has caused an increase in the "nationalization of commerce" through the increase of interstate business. Id. The modern change in commercial
transactions has made it far less burdensome for a nonresident to be sued across state
lines. Id. See CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1268 (discussing that when the first two elements of
a prima facie case of minimum contacts are satisfied, purposeful availment and activities of
the defendant arising from the claim, then there is an inference that the third factor of
reasonableness is satisfied).
32. Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1117.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Reynolds, 23 F.3d at 1117.
37. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for the minimum contacts requirements.
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sonal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.38
B. CYBERSPACE
The inherent nature of cyberspace has challenged the traditional application of minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction. The inherent
feature of cyberspace is its world-wide nature. 3 9 For example, when an
Internet user posts information on his Web site, that information becomes an Internet publication that is available world-wide almost instantaneously. 40 Furthermore, the nature of cyberspace allows Internet
users to access a Web site41 without any awareness of the jurisdiction in
which the Web site resides. 4 2 Moreover, the Internet allows users to
jump from jurisdiction to jurisdiction on an international level within
seconds. 43 Because there are no physical boundaries on the Internet,
and because of the Internet's world-wide nature, those posting information on the Internet are not posting information to be read by others in a
specific jurisdiction. Thus, the very nature of cyberspace challenges
traditional applications of personal jurisdiction when applied to cyberspace's global exposure.
Notwithstanding the difficulty of interpreting traditional applications of personal jurisdiction over the Internet, the legal rights of Internet users must be protected to the extent the U.S. Constitution will
allow. According to recent cases that involve personal jurisdiction on the
Internet, intellectual property owners have been affected by the constitutional limitations of courts exercising personal jurisdiction. Thus, even
though personal jurisdiction is a challenge in cyberspace, the Internet is
44
not above the law.
38. World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 291. A state court may only exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant when minimum contacts exist between the defendant and the forum state. Id. Furthermore, minimum contacts will protect the defendant from litigating in a distant and inconvenient forum. Id. at 292.
39. Carl Oppedahl, Remedies in Domain Name Lawsuits:How is a Domain Name Like
a Cow?, 15 J. MAsHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 437, 438 (1997). "The Web allows anyone
to be an instant publisher, and the publication is not only instant but world wide." Id.
40. Id. at 39.
41. See Intermatic, Inc., v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1231 (N.D. 111. 1996). A Web
site or Web page is basically a "computer data file" operating from a Web server. Id. A
Web site may contain "any message, name, word, sound or picture, or combination of such
elements," or even several pages of information. Id.
42. Zembek, supra note 11, at 356.
43. Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 929 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (explaining how a user can
select highlighted text within a Web site called a "link" which allows the user to automatically traverse between different Web sites regardless of their jurisdiction). Intermatic, 947
F. Supp. at 1232. A "hyperlink" is a designated space on any given site that by clicking on
the space, the "hyperlink" will automatically link to another site on the Internet. Id.
44. Zembeck, supra note 11, at 347 (discussing the boundaries of cyberspace).
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Although "prima facie evidence" 4 5 may exist that an Internet user's
rights have been violated, courts must first have personal jurisdiction to
bring the violator to court.46 To rule on personal jurisdiction issues that
involve the Internet, courts must have a sound understanding of the relationship between Internet users, 4 7 service providers, 48 and content
providers 4 9 regarding the Internet. The challenges of finding personal
jurisdiction on the Internet will unfold once an understanding is gained
of how the Internet operates and effective comparisons of existing law
are made with cyberspace. 50 One theory in the law that is similar to
posting information on the Internet is the theory of placing a product
into the "stream of commerce."

45. BLACis LAw DIc-oNARv 1190 (6th ed. 1990). "Evidence good and sufficient on its
face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or
the group or chain of facts constituting the party's claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient." Id.
46. Raysman & Brown, supra note 1, at 3. To enter judgment against the parties, a
court must have personal jurisdiction over the parties, subject matter jurisdiction over the
claims, and proper venue. Id.
47. Karen S. Frank, Potential Liability On The Internet, 437 PLI/PAT 417, 422 (Mar.
1996). Internet users are individuals either loading onto or accessing information from the
Internet. Id.
48. Id. Service providers are companies that allow Internet users or subscribers access
to the Internet. Id. MooRE, supra note 4, at 35. Service providers include CompuServe,
Prodigy, and American Online and generally provide most of the service that is available
on-line. Id. Service providers are easily accessible, providing one has access to a computer
with a modem. Id. Service providers allow the Internet user access to download texts and
software by e-mail, shopping access, and informational news. Id.
49. Frank, supra note 47, at 422. Information is loaded onto the Internet by Content
Providers. Id. One form of content providers are Web page providers. Id. A Web page or a
Web site contains files for Internet users to access and download. Id. An Internet user
may access or link to various Web sites by clicking on highlighted text within a Web site.
Id. at 422-23. The series of linked web sites is the World Wide Web which is a part of the
Internet. Frank, supra, at 424. Other types of content providers are Digital Libraries/
Information Sources and bulletin board operators. Id. at 423. The Digital Libraries may be
files from universities and are available on the Internet. Id. A bulletin board Service
uploads information in a manner for their subscribers to easily access. Id. at 423.
50. Zembek, supranote 11, at 357. Most people, lawyer and layman alike, still think of
cyberspace as a place, rather than a form of communication. Id. Failure to recognize the
nature of the Internet, along with a lack of understanding regarding the basic reasoning
behind jurisdictional due process limits, have caused the courts to displace these issues
within existing jurisprudence. Id. It is necessary in future jurisdictional disputes for the
courts to achieve predictable results. Id. This requires that courts recognize the cyberspace reality as a form of communication. See Hernandez & May, supra note 4, at 5 (discussing the logic of fully understanding the issue of personal jurisdiction on the Internet
once the mechanics of the Internet are understood).
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THE "STREAM OF COMMERCE" ACCORDING TO AS&4fi v. SUPERIoUR
COURT OF CAIFORNA4

Traditionally, the "stream of commerce" 5 1 has dealt with product
liability lawsuits where manufacturers and distributors send products
across state and international lines.5 2 Intellectual property on the Internet is similar to a product being distributed into the stream of commerce, except intellectual property being posted on the Internet is
instantaneously available on a world-wide basis. 53
The Supreme
Court's latest decision dealing with the stream of commerce is Asahi v.
54
Superior Court of California.
In Asahi, a Japanese manufacturer sold its product to a distributor. 65 The distributor then sold that product world-wide,5 6 which the
court termed as placing a "product into the stream of commerce."5 7 A
product liability suit arose out of California 58 and the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the California court's exercise of personal jurisdiction
violated the Due Process Clause.5 9 Moreover, Justice O'Connor and Justice Brennan delivered differing plurality opinions on the issue of what
constitutes purposeful availment when dealing with the stream of
51. BLAcis LAw DICTIONARY 1421 (6th ed. 1990). "Term used to describe goods which
remain in interstate commerce though held with in a state for a short period of time. If
such goods remain in the stream of commerce, they are not subject to local taxation." Id.
Furthermore, stream of commerce activity that occurs locally is considered part of the interstate movement. Id.
52. For examples and a discussion of product liability lawsuits dealing with the stream
of commerce, see Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. 286; Quesenberry infra note 170, at 191; Martin
F. Noonan, Civil Procedure-PersonalJurisdiction:Evolution CurrentInterpretationof the
Stream of Commerce Test in the Third Circuit, 40 VRL. L. REv. 779 (1995).
53. See Bruce T. Atkins, Trading Secrets in the InformationAge: Can Trade Secret
Law Survive the Internet?, 96 U. ILL. L. REv. 1151 (1996) (discussing how the very presence
of information on the Internet has access to millions of Internet users the instant the information is published); Oppedahl, supra note 39, at 438 (discussing the instantaneous nature
of the Internet).
54. Asahi, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
55. Id. Asahi is the manufacturer of tire tube valve assemblies who then sells the
assemblies to several tire distributors. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 112. See supra notes 51 and 63 and accompanying text discussing the placement of a product into the stream of commerce.
58. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102-03. The California Supreme Court held that Asahi's intentional act of placing the product into the stream of commerce by delivering them to the
distributor, coupled with an awareness that some of its products would reach California,
was sufficient grounds for California's State Court to exercise jurisdiction under the Due
Process Clause. Id.
59. Id. at 116 (holding that California's exercise of personal jurisdiction over Asahi
exceeds the limits of due process).
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commerce. 60
Justice O'Connor's opinion adopted a narrow interpretation of the
stream of commerce. 6 1 O'Connor's opinion found that placing a "product
into the stream of commerce, without more, "6 2 did not meet the purposeful availment requirement for minimum contacts. 63 O'Connor explained that the awareness of a defendant that its product has entered a
forum state by the stream of commerce does not equate to an act purposefully availing oneself to a forum state.6 4 O'Connor further explained that additional conduct is conduct that "may indicate an intent
or purpose to serve the market in the forum state."6 5 Thus, under
O'Connor's opinion, beyond placing a product into the stream of commerce, additional action by the defendant towards the forum state is re66
quired to satisfy minimum contacts.
Justice Brennan's opinion of the stream of commerce maintains a
broader interpretation than that of Justice O'Connor.6 7 Brennan's opinion began by rejecting the additional contact requirement of O'Connor,
reasoning that "the stream of commerce refers not to unpredictable currents or eddies, but to the regular and anticipated flow of products from
manufacturer to distribution to retail sale."68 Brennan states that as
long as a defendant is "aware that the final product is being marketed in
the forum State" through the stream of commerce, the defendant cannot
be surprised to defend a suit within the forum. 69 Thus, under Brennan's
60. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 108-13 (discussing Justice O'Connor's opinion of the stream of
commerce, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia); Id. at 116-21
(discussing Justice Brennan's opinion of the stream of commerce, joined by Justices White,
Marshall, and Stevens).
61. See Quesenberry, infra note 170, at 201-02 (discussing O'Connor's opinion of the
stream of commerce).
62. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. See supra note 51 and infra note 63 and accompanying text
for further information on placing a product into the stream of commerce.
63. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112. "The placement of a product into the stream of commerce,
without more, is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed toward the forum State."
Id. Furthermore, the awareness of the defendant that "the stream of commerce may or will
sweep the product into the forum State does not convert the mere act of placing the product
into the stream into an act purposefully directed toward the forum State." Id. See Earl M.
Maltz, Unraveling the Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction:A Comment on
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California, 1987 DUKE L.J. 669, 683 (Sept.
1987) (analyzing the Asahi decision and purposeful availment with knowledge of a product's ultimate destination as its placed into the stream of commerce).
64. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
65. Id.
66. Id. See infra notes 161-163 and accompanying text discussing the additional action
required in Asahi's "stream of commerce" analysis.
67. See Quesenberry, infra note 170, at 202-03 (discussing Brennan's opinion of the
stream of commerce).
68. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-17.
69. Id. at 117.
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opinion, awareness of one's product in the stream of commerce entering a
forum state satisfies the minimum contacts requirement.
D.

INTEGRATING CYBERSPACE WITH PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Recently, the appellate court in CompuServe v. Paterson70 applied
Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi to Internet contacts creating a
71
framework for integrating cyberspace with personal jurisdiction.
Other cases are applying the framework found in CompuServe, where
the defendant is either involved in clear commercial activity on the Internet or the defendant's Internet activity is characterized as passive. A
discussion of CompuServe and other cases that apply the CompuServe
framework follow.
1. Commercial Activity on the Internet
a.

CompuServe v. Patterson

Recently, the appellate court reversed the district court's holding in
CompuServe v. Patterson.72 The district court held that Patterson's Internet contacts were too tenuous to establish personal jurisdiction. 7 3 In
reversing the district court's decision, the appellate court found that Patterson had established minimum contacts with the forum state which
74
satisfied personal jurisdiction by applying O'Connor's opinion in Asahi.
The appellate court's holding in the CompuServe reversal establishes the
factors necessary to satisfy minimum contacts that are limited to the Internet.75 Thus, CompuServe's reversal addresses a framework for integrating cyberspace contacts with personal jurisdiction.
CompuServe is a computer information service provider for the Internet, based in Columbus, Ohio, and the second largest provider of its
70. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996) (reversing the U.S.

District Court's decision holding that Patterson's minimum contacts with the state of Ohio
satisfies due process).
71. Id. at 1262. This case presents a novel question of first impression of whether
contacts that are "almost entirely electronic in nature, are sufficient, under the Due Process Clause," to support personal jurisdiction. Id.

72. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1257. U.S. Appellate Court, Sixth Circuit, Judge Bailey
Brown reversed and remanded the District Court's decision on July 22, 1996, holding that
Patterson's minimum contacts with the state of Ohio satisfies due process. Id.
73. CompuServe v. Patterson, No. C2-94-91, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20352, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Aug. 11, 1994), rev'd, 89 F.3d 1257 (July 22, 1996) (holding that Patterson's minimum
contacts were too tenuous to establish personal jurisdiction).
74. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1257.
75. See id. at 1263-69 (discussing the minimum contacts in CompuServe). Based upon
the unique nature of this case, the court also explained that it did not hold that: "Patterson
would be subject to suit in any state where his software was purchased or used;" and that
CompuServe could not "sue any regular subscriber to its service for nonpayment in Ohio."
Id. at 1268.

1997]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE

kind. 76 Patterson is a subscriber to CompuServe's services and is based

out of Houston, Texas. 77 Patterson entered into a "shareware"7 8 contract with CompuServe where Patterson provided software to CompuServe to sell over the Internet. 79 In addition to Patterson's software,
CompuServe began to sell its own software with a name similar to Patterson's software.8 0 Patterson notified CompuServe electronically,
claiming that CompuServe violated Patterson's trademark with similarly named software. 8 ' Although CompuServe changed the name of its
82
software, Patterson continued to complain.
When Patterson demanded $100,000 for trademark infringement,
CompuServe filed a declaratory judgment action in Ohio's federal
76. Id. at 1260.
77. Id.
78. LANCE ROSE, THE INTERNET UNLEASHED: COPYRIGHT ON THE NETWORKS 1082

(1994). Express licenses are found on computer networks in connection with software. Id.
Shareware is one popular marketing method that utilizes the rapid, wide distribution abilities of the networks. Id. The shareware license, an important part of the shareware package, grants two different kinds of free licenses to the general public: a trial use license and
an electronic distribution license. Id.
The trial use license allows users who download the shareware package to use the
software on a test basis during a specified time frame. Id. If the user wishes to continue
using the software after the trial period, he is then expected to pay a registration fee.
ROSE, supra, at 1082.
The electronic distribution license basically allows unrestricted distribution of the
shareware package over the networks. Id. However, no fee may be charged for distributing the package. Id. Although such free licenses are generally granted to the public,
shareware copyright owners frequently require contact from certain distributors for permission to distribute the software. Id.
79. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260. Patterson became a shareware provider, entering
into a "Shareware Registration Agreement" ("SRA") with CompuServe. Id. The SRA allows subscribers to CompuServe access to the software that Patterson creates and sends to
CompuServe. Id. The SRA incorporates two other agreements, the CompuServe Service
Agreement and the Rules of Operation, which expressly provide the agreements are entered into in Ohio, and to "be governed by and construed in accordance with" Ohio law. Id.
Patterson's SRA was transmitted electronically from his computer in Texas, where Patterson manifested his assent to the agreement, then transmitted to CompuServe's system in
Ohio. Id. at 1260-61. From 1991-94, CompuServe electronically received 32 master
software files from Patterson, where the files were stored in CompuServe's system and
displayed for CompuServe's subscribers. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261. The subscribers
have opportunity to download the software from CompuServe, which CompuServe takes a
15% fee and the balance is given to Patterson. Id. at 1260-61.
80. Id. at 1261. Patterson's software was designed to help Internet subscribers navigate around the Internet, where Patterson's software is named WinNAV, Windows Navigator, and Flashpoint Windows Navigator. Id. In December 1993, after Patterson learned of
CompuServe marketing similar software, named CompuServe Navigator, Patterson notified CompuServe that it was violating Patterson's common law trademarks that he owned.
Id.
81. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1261.
82. Id.
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court.8 3 Patterson responded with a 12(b)(2) motion, claiming lack of

personal jurisdiction,8 4 which the district court granted.8 5 However, the
appellate court reversed8 6 after applying the minimum contacts analysis
and determining that personal jurisdiction8 7 over Patterson was consistent with due process.88
First, the court considered whether Patterson purposefully availed
himself of the privilege of doing business in Ohio.8 9 The court ruled that
Patterson satisfied this requirement by: (1) being party to a shareware
contract which was governed by Ohio law; 90 and (2) exchanging multiple
Internet communications with CompuServe's service in Ohio. 9 1
Second, the court considered whether CompuServe's claim arose
from Patterson's activities with the forum state. 92 Though Patterson
could have marketed his software by other means, the court found that
because Patterson had limited his software marketing solely through
CompuServe's service in Ohio, this established activities arising from the
cause of action within the forum state. 93 Furthermore, the court found
that Patterson's electronic communication sent to CompuServe in Ohio,
in which Patterson accused CompuServe of trademark infringement,
also satisfied the requirement that CompuServe's claim arose out of the
83. Id. CompuServe is asking for a declaration that it had not infringed Patterson's
trademarks and not "guilty of unfair or deceptive trade practices." Id. Based upon Patterson's trademark allegations, CompuServe claims a threat of $10.8 million of software sales
revenue. Id.
84. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1260.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1269.
87. Id. at 1263.

88. Id. See supra note 23 (quoting the Due Process Clause as contained in the U.S.
Constitution).
89. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1263.
90. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text discussing information on shareware
agreements and Patterson's shareware involvement.
91. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1264. In CompuServe, the court found purposeful availment primarily because of the shareware contract Patterson entered with CompuServe. Id.
The contract stated that it was to be "governed by and construed in light of Ohio law," in
agreement for CompuServe to post Patterson's software on the Internet. Id. at 66. Purposeful availment was found because: (1) Patterson electronically transmitted his software
on several occasions from Texas to CompuServe's system in Ohio; (2) Patterson purposefully advertised his software through CompuServe's system in Ohio; and (3) Patterson sold
as a third party provider to Internet users who downloaded Patterson's software from the
CompuServe system in Ohio. Id. at 1264. Scott Petty, Which Court Has JurisdictionOver
Cyberspace?, INTmLL. PROP. TODAY, Nov. 1996, at 13 (analyzing the factors that purposefully availed Patterson of the privilege of doing business in Ohio).
92. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267.
93. Id. The result of marketing exclusively in Ohio will arguably limit the claims to
arise out of Ohio. Id.
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forum state. 94
Finally, the court considered whether the facts satisfied the reasonableness test. 9 5 The court found that even though it may have burdened
Patterson to defend a suit in Ohio, the suit was reasonable for the following reasons: (1) CompuServe's interest was $10 million in potential damages;9 6 (2) the decision would have a substantial impact on other
contracts for providers like Patterson;9 7 and (3) Patterson's knowledge
that he benefited from the shareware contract and that it connected him
to Ohio law. 98
b.

Zippo Manufacturing v. Zippo Dot Coin

Zippo9 9 is a recent case with minimum contacts similar to CompuServe. 0 0 In Zippo, the plaintiff is a Pennsylvania corporation named
Zippo Manufacturing ("Manufacturing") and is known for manufacturing
the "Zippo" tobacco lighter.1 0 1 The defendant, Zippo Dot Coin ("Dot
Coin"), is a California corporation that operates a Web site along with a
news service.1 0 2 Dot Coin's use of the word Zippo in its Web site,' 0 3
news service heading,1 0 4 and domain name 105 that is advertised to
Pennsylvania residents is the basis for which Manufacturing has
94. Id. CompuServe's claim arose because Patterson sought an injunction from CompuServe's software sales from their system in Ohio. Id. See supra note 80 and accompanying text discussing the trademark conflict between CompuServe and Patterson.

95. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1267-68.
96. Id. at 1268.
97. Id.
98. Id. See supra note 79 and accompanying text discussing Patterson's shareware
contract.
99. Zippo Manufacturing Comp. v. Zippo Dot Coin, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
100. Id. at 1125. "This is a 'doing business over the Internet' case in the line of CompuServe .... " Id.
101. Id.at 1121.
102. Id.
103. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121. "Dot Coin's Web site contains information about the
company, advertisements and an application for its Internet news service." Id.
104. Id. There are three levels offered in the news service that are "public/free, Original, and Super." Id. To subscribe to the "Original" or "Super" news server the Internet
user does the following:
... fills out an on-line application that asks for a variety of information including
the person's name and address. Payment is made by credit card over the Internet
or the telephone. The application is then processed and the subscriber is assigned
a password which permits the subscriber to view and the subscriber then receives
a password which permits the Internet user to download/or download Internet
newsgroup messages that are stored on the Defendant's [Zippo Dot Com] server in
California.
Id.
105. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1121. Dot Coin has received the exclusive right to use the
domain names "zippo.com, zippo.net, and zipponews.com" on the Internet. Id.
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brought suit against Dot Corn for trademark infringement and diluCorn moved for a 12(b)(2) motion for lack of personal
tion.1 0 6 Dot
10 7

jurisdiction.

The court recognized that Dot Corn's minimum contacts were "almost exclusively over the Internet." 0 8 Dot Corn's Internet contacts with
Pennsylvania consisted of Dot Corn posting its Internet news service on
its Web site and then contracting with Pennsylvania Internet users who
were interested in receiving the news service.10 9 Further, to make available the news service for those Pennsylvania Internet users who contracted with Dot Corn, Dot Corn has "entered into agreements" with
seven Pennsylvania Internet access providers.1 1 0
Although Dot Corn's contacts with Pennsylvania residents were
through its Web site, the court still found personal jurisdiction by determining Dot Corn's minimum contacts. 1 1 ' First, similar to the reasoning
in CompuServe, the court in Zippo found that Dot Coin purposefully
availed itself of the laws of Pennsylvania."1 2 The court reasoned that the
contractual agreements with Pennsylvania residents and Internet access
providers put Dot Corn on notice, making a conscious choice to conduct
and thus purposefully
business with the residents of Pennsylvania,
3
availing itself of the state's laws."1
Second, the court considered whether Manufacturing's claim arises
out of Dot Com's activities within Pennsylvania."1 4 The court found that
because Manufacturing is a Pennsylvania corporation, the trademark infringement would substantially occur in Pennsylvania when Dot Corn's
106. Id. (claiming that the name "Zippo" found in the domain names, locations on the
Web site, and in the newsgroup heading was the basis for trademark infringement).
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 1120.
Id. at 1121.
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126.
Id.
Id.
Id.

113. Id. Pennsylvania residents' applications were processed repeatedly and passwords
were assigned by Dot Com. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126. Dot Corn was aware that electronic communications would be sent into Pennsylvania as a direct result of Internet contracts. Id. "The transmission of these files was entirely within its control. Dot Corn cannot
maintain that these contracts are 'fortuitous' or 'coincidental' . ... When a defendant
makes a conscious choice to conduct business with the residents of a forum state, 'it has
clear notice that it is subject to suit there.'" Id. (citing World Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at
297). Dot Corn chose to sell its services to residents in Pennsylvania. Id. There was no
obligation to sell those services. Id. If the risk of personal jurisdiction in a forum is deemed
too great, then a corporation may cut its connections to that forum. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at
1126-27. The choice not to sell services to residents of Pennsylvania should have been
made if Dot Corn did not want to be subject to the jurisdiction of Pennsylvania. Id.
114. Id. at 1127.

1997]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE

messages were viewed by the state's residents. 1 15 Thus, the court concluded that Manufacturing's claim arose from Dot Corn's messages being
1 16
transmitted over the Internet in Pennsylvania.
Finally, the court considered the question of the reasonableness of
finding personal jurisdiction."17 The court's considerations were Pennsylvania's interests in adjudicating trademark infringement disputes of
corporations within the jurisdiction."18 Further, Dot Corn "consciously
chose to conduct business in Pennsylvania, pursuing profits from the actions that are now in question."" i 9 For these reasons, the court found
that finding personal jurisdiction was reasonable.
2.

Passive Activity on the Internet

a.

120
Bensusan v. King

Bensusan, a New York corporation, owns the federal registered
trademark known as THE BLUE NOTE, which is the name of Bensusan's jazz club in New York City.' 21 King, a resident of Missouri, owns
a small jazz club named "The Blue Note" in Columbia, Missouri.12 2 King
posted a Web site on the Internet to promote business by displaying his
123
jazz club event dates and information to order tickets by phone.
King created a link with Bensusan's Web site, providing information
about Bensusan's jazz club. i 24 Furthermore, the link provided direct access with Bensusan's jazz club Web site.' 25 Since Bensusan holds a
trademark over THE BLUE NOTE mark,' 2 6 Bensusan filed a lawsuit
115. Id. "[A] cause of action for trademark infringement occurs where the passing off
occurs." Id. (citing Tefal, S.A. v. Products Intl Co., 529 F.2d 495, 496 n.1 (3d Cir. 1976)).
116. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1127.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Bensusan Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 9,
1996) (holding that personal jurisdiction over King, a nonresident of New York, would
violate the due process clause where King's only contact with New York was a Web site on
the Internet).
121. Id. at 297.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 297-98.
124. Id. King's Web site included a disclaimer stating: "The Blue Note's Cyberspot

should not be confused with one of the world's finest jazz clubs the Blue Note, located in the
heart of New York's Greenwich Village. If you should find yourself in the big apple give
them a visit." Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 297-98. Along with the disclaimer was a hyperlink, which directly accessed Bensusan's Web site. Id. at 298. When Bensusan objected to
King's Web site, King dropped the hyperlink and the statement "Ifyou should find yourself
in the big apple give them a visit" from his Web site. Id.
125. Id. at 298.
126. Id. at 297.
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against King in the New York District Court for trademark violation. 12 7
The Bensusan court found that Bensusan could not sue King in a
New York court. 128 The court reasoned that King did not have sufficient
contacts with New York to allow the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
King. 12 9 The court analyzed whether minimum contacts that are limited
to a Web site on the Internet are sufficient to allow a state to exercise
130
personal jurisdiction over a defendant.
The court found that maintaining a Web site on the Internet did not
purposefully avail King to the laws of New York.131 Rather, the court
found that maintaining a Web site was like placing a product in the
stream of commerce, which may be felt nationwide or even worldwide. 13 2 Furthermore, the court noted that merely placing a product
into the stream of commerce is not enough for a court to find purposeful
availment 1 3 3 Thus, the court in Bensusan held that additional conduct
towards the forum state is necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction
34
when Internet contacts are involved.'
b.

Hearst v. Goldberger

Hearstv. Goldberger13 5 is a recent case similar to the Bensusan decision. 136 Hearst is a corporation in New York and the owner and publisher of Esquire Magazine,137 owning the ESQUIRE trademark. 138
Goldberger is an attorney in New Jersey who had the idea of creating a
127. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 298.
128. Id. at 300-01. Even if New York's long-arm statute allowed jurisdiction for the
courts, personal jurisdiction over King would violate the due process as applied by the minimum contacts analysis. Id. at 300.
129. Id. at 301.
130. Id. at 297.
131. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301.
132. Id. "King, like numerous others, simply created a Web site and permitted anyone
who could find it to access it. Creating a site, like placing a product into the stream of
commerce, may be felt nationwide but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed
toward the forum state." Id.
133. Id.
134. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 301 (following O'Connor's opinion in Asahi for additional contact with the forum state and then distinguishing Bensusan's facts from CompuServe's facts, where additional activity was established in CompuServe).
135. Hearst Corp. v. Goldberger, No. 96 Civ. 3620, 1997 WL 97097 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26,
1997).
136. See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300 (discussing the nature of a Web site being similar to "placing a product into the stream of commerce").
137. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *3 (stating that Esquire Magazine has been published
since 1933).
138. Id. (stating that Hearst is owner of the registered trademarks ESQUIRE and
ESQ., and owner the registered domain names viaesquire.com, esquiremag.com, and
esquireb2b.com).
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Web site that provided attorneys "legal support services" by computer. 13 9
Goldberger decided to name his service "ESQ.WIRE 1" and registered the
domain name esqwire.com. 140 After the Web site was accessible and was
advertising Goldberger's future service, 14 1 Hearst filed a complaint
against Goldberger in a New York District Court, 1 42 and subsequently
Goldberger moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of personal jurisdic143
tion and failure to state a claim.
The court found that Goldberger's contacts with New York were limited to Goldberger's Web site. 144 The Hearstcourt followed the Bensusan
decision, stating that "Goldberger has 'simply created a Web site and
permitted anyone who could find it to access it,'" finding that "a [W]eb
site, without more," is not sufficient contacts to provide personal jurisdiction. 145 Further, the court addressed various e-mail messages sent to
and from New York in conjunction to the Web site, but discounts the email messages for two reasons.14 6 First, the e-mail messages occurred
subsequent to Hearst bringing this suit. 1 4 7 And second, the court considered the e-mail messages analogous to telephone or letter communications, finding that communications of this type "are not sufficient to
establish personal jurisdiction under . . . the due process clause." 148
Thus, the Hearst court held that personal jurisdiction in New York was
not proper, finding that upholding personal jurisdiction over Goldberger
"would, in effect, create national (or even worldwide) jurisdiction." 14 9
139. Id. "In 1992, Goldberger came up with the idea to create an electronic law office
infrastructure network that would provide individual attorneys, via computer, with legal
support services equivalent to those available to lawyers practicing in large law firms." Id.
140. Id. at *4. Goldberger registered for the Internet domain name esqwire.com in Sept.
1995 and later published a world-wide Web site in June 1996. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at
*4.

141. Id. Goldberger's web site includes a brief description of Goldberger's future services, a summary of Hearst's present lawsuit activities against Goldberger, and computer
links to court filings and other related documents. Id. Goldberger's future services are

described at his Web site as follows:
ESQ.wirek will provide virtual law firm support services, legal information services and products to enable attorneys to practice law anywhere on the planet, with
the simple click of a mouse. We are looking for attorneys in every jurisdiction in
the world to become a part of this revolutionary virtual legal community. For
more information, please e-mail esqwire@esqwire.com.

Id.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
Maritz

Id. at *5.
Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *5.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *16.
Id. at *12.
Id. (stating that contacts are only relevant prior to litigation).
Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *13.
Id. at *20. The Hearstcourt stated in its conclusion that it saw some truth with the
court's statement of: "while modern technology has made nationwide commercial
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In summary, these cases establish a framework for integrating
cyberspace contacts with personal jurisdiction by applying the "additional activity" standard set forth in Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi.
Most importantly, the CompuServe reversal sets precedent by requiring
"additional activity" for cyberspace contacts to establish personal
jurisdiction.
III. ANALYSIS
The remainder of this comment analyzes and argues for the more
restrictive standard of "additional activity," as given by O'Connor in
Asahi in conjunction with recent Internet case law. Furthermore, this
comment will consider the problems of holding for personal jurisdiction
when minimum contacts are limited to the Internet, and the possible effects on the Internet's future.
A.

ADDITIONAL ACTIVITY AS A STANDARD FOR PERSONAL JURISDICTION
IN CYBERSPACE

The Internet cases discussed above demonstrate what type of Internet activity will make a defendant susceptible to another forum's jurisdiction. The CompuServe court followed Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Asahi' 5 0 to develop its minimum contacts analysis.' 5 1 In Asahi,
O'Connor's opinion of requiring additional activity is a perfect analogy
for the type of contacts involved with personal jurisdiction in cyberspace.
1. Analogizing the Stream of Commerce
In Asahi, O'Connor's opinion of what will satisfy personal jurisdiction in the stream of commerce is an analogous standard for Internet
transactions simpler and more feasible .... it must broaden correspondingly the permissible scope of jurisdiction exercisable by the courts." Id. at *20 (citing Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at
1334). However, the Hearst court felt somewhat differently by stating.
[T]hat to allow personal jurisdiction based on an Internet web site 'would be tantamount to a declaration that this Court, and every other court throughout the
world, may assert [personal] jurisdiction over all information providers on the
global World Wide Web. Such a holding would have a devastating impact on those
who use this global service.
Id. at *20 (citing Playboy Enter., Inc. v. Chuckleberry Publ'g., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1032,
1039-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
150. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102.
151. CompuServe,89 F.3d at 1265 (comparing the stream of commerce theory in Asahi).
"Admittedly, merely entering into a contract with CompuServe would not, without more,
establish that Patterson had minimum contacts with Ohio. By the same token, Patterson's
injection of his software product into the stream of commerce, without more, would be at
best a dubious ground for jurisdiction." Id. However, because Patterson both placed his
product into the stream of commerce and entered into a contract with CompuServe, the
CompuServe court held there were ample contacts to exercise personal jurisdiction. Id.
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personal jurisdiction. 15 2 For example, like the Japanese manufacturer
in Asahi selling its product to a distributor, 15 3 an Internet user may post
intellectual property (Internet user's product) on its Web site through an
Internet service provider. 1 54 Furthermore, like the distributor in Asahi
placing the "product into the stream of commerce," 15 5 a service provider
makes available the Internet user's Web site world-wide and essentially
15 6
places the Web site into the "stream of commerce."
Now, consider the difference between a product liability stream of
commerce found in Asahi and the Internet's stream of commerce. The
Internet's stream of commerce is much more ubiquitous and instantaneous than the product liability type stream of commerce. 15 7 If O'Connor's
opinion expressed the necessity of having additional contacts for the
product liability's stream of commerce, 158 then additional contacts for
159
the Internet's stream of commerce is essential.
As defined by Justice O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, contacts that involve the "stream of commerce" 160 require additional action by the defendant towards the forum state. 16 1 In CompuServe, Patterson's
software was placed on the Internet through CompuServe's service or
"placed into the stream of commerce." 16 2 Thus, Patterson's shareware
152. See, e.g., Gupta, infra note 166, at 533 (discussing how a "BBS operator injects the

BBS into the stream of cyberspace" or commerce as an analogy with Justice O'Connor's
opinion of the steam of commerce).
153. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
154. See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text describing the functions of Internet
Providers and Web site postings.
155. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
156. See Intermatic, 947 F. Supp. at 1239 (discussing the "in commerce" requirement of
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995). "Because Internet communications transmit
instantaneously on a worldwide basis there is little question that the 'in commerce' requirement would be met in a typical Internet message." Id. The court found that the "use of the
Internet is sufficient to meet the 'in commerce' requirement of the [Lanham] Act." Id. at 38.
See Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300(comparing the placement of a Web site on the Internet
to a product being placed into the stream of commerce). See, e.g., supra note 151, comparing
Patterson's product placed on the Internet with placing a "product into the stream of
commerce."
157. See Robert A. Bourque & Kerry L. Konrad, The Tangled Web: First Wave of Internet Cases ProvidesMore Questions than Answers, 8 No. 11 J. PROPRIETARY RTS. 2, at *2
(1996) (discussing the question of being subject to personal jurisdiction on the Internet due
to the nature of the Web's implications of instant global publication).
158. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
159. See, e.g., CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257; Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 1119; Bensusan, 937 F.
Supp. 295; Hearst, 1997 WL 97097 (explaining that the additional activity standard is nec-

essary for Internet contacts).
160. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
161. Id. See, e.g., CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1265 (explaining that "without more" beyond
placing a product into the stream of commerce, the defendant's act is not purposefully directed to the forum).
162. Id. at 1265.
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contract with CompuServe was the additional action required to meet
the purposeful availment requirement for minimum contacts. 163 Moreover, O'Connor's opinion of the "stream of commerce" makes for a well
16 4
suited analogy when minimum contacts involve the Internet.
The CompuServe reversal lays the precedent for Internet stream of
commerce cases by following O'Connor's opinion of requiring "additional
activity."16 5 However, "additional activity" raises two central questions.
First, why is additional activity required, and second, what will constitute additional activity?
2.

Why "additionalactivity?"

Additional activity beyond a product entering a forum through the
stream of commerce is an important requirement for the minimum contacts analysis because of the very nature of the Internet. 166 By nature,
once information is posted on the Internet, that information is instantly
in the stream of commerce on a world-wide basis.

167

Traditionally, the stream of commerce is used for product liability
claims where a manufacturers product is distributed across state and
international boundaries. 16 8 In Asahi, Justice Brennan's opinion required a defendant to be aware of a product entering a forum through the
9
stream of commerce to establish minimum contacts with that forum. 16
Many commentators have regarded Brennan's opinion, as opposed to
O'Connor's opinion, to be best suited to a stream of commerce analysis
0
dealing with product liability claims. 17
163. Id. at 1264-65. See supra notes 79 and 91 and accompanying text discussing Patterson's involvement with the shareware contract and why Patterson satisfied the purposeful availment requirement.
164. See, e.g., CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1266 (stating that "Patterson's injection of his
software product into the stream of commerce, without more, would be at best a dubious
ground for jurisdiction); Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300 (stating that "[c]reating a [Web]
site, like placing a product into the stream of commerce, may be felt nationwide - or even
worldwide - but, without more, it is not an act purposefully directed toward the forum
state").
165. CompuServe, 89 F.3d at 1266 (citing O'Connor's plurality opinion, Asahi, 480 U.S.
at 112).
166. Sonia K Gupta, Bulletin Board Systems and Personal Jurisdiction: What Comports with FairPlay and SubstantialJustice?, 1996 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 519, 533-34 (1996)
(discussing why Justice O'Connor's opinion of the stream of commerce provides a better
minimum contacts analysis for Internet related activity).
167. Supra note 156; Atkin, supra note 53, at 1151 (discussing how the very presence of
information on the Internet instantly has access to millions of Internet users).
168. Supra note 52.
169. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 116-21.
170. For instances where commentators follow Brennan's opinion see, e.g., Timothy C.
Lynch, Roman Candles and Bottle Rockets: The Eighth Circuit Blows Up the "Stream of
Commerce Plus"Analysis in Barone v. Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks, Inc., 29
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However, the stream of commerce dealing with the Internet is different, because the product or intellectual property posted on the Internet is
directly and instantaneously dispersed literally everywhere in the
world.1 7 1 Although the Internet user may be aware his product is being
dispersed world-wide, the awareness is general because of the worldwide nature of the Internet.17 2 Further, because of the Internet's worldwide nature without physical boundaries, the Internet user has no notice
of which jurisdiction his product may enter. 173 Without notice given to
an Internet user, many Internet personal jurisdiction cases are following
the O'Connor requirement of having additional activity within a forum
beyond the Internet's stream of commerce contact. 174 Thus, because of
the Internet's world-wide nature without physical boundaries,
O'Connor's opinion that requires the defendant to have additional activity provides the Internet user with adequate notice of infringement
within a forum.
3.

What is 'additionalactivity?"

In Asahi, Justice O'Connor indicates what type of activity can be
considered additional activity when a product is placed in the stream of
commerce to satisfy purposeful availment. 7 5 O'Connor's opinion states:
Additional conduct of the defendant may indicate an intent or purpose
to serve the market in the forum State, for example, designing the product for the market in the forum State, advertising in the forum State,
CREIGHTON L. REv. 1371 (1996); Elizabeth Jones, Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co.-

The Pure Stream of Commerce no Longer Flows Through the Fourth Circuit, 29 U. RICH. L.
Rzv. 421, (1995); Gary A. Magnarini, Jurisdiction over Foreign-NationManufacturers

Tracking the Resurgent "Stream of Commerce" Theory, 68 FLA. BJ. 38 (1994); Stephen E.
Quesenberry, Civil Procedure-Muddyingthe Stream of Commerce Theory-Ashai Metal
Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 191 (1987); R. Lawrence Dessem, Per-

sonal JurisdictionAfter Asahi: The Other (International)Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REV. 41
(1987); Erik T. Moe, Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court: The Stream of Commerce
Doctrine,Barely Alive but Still Kicking, 76 GEo. L. J. 203 (1987).
171. Atkins, supra note 53, at 1151 (discussing how the very presence of information on
the Internet has access to millions of Internet users the instant the information is
published).
172. Atkins, supra note 53, at 1151.
173. See David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1370-76 (1996). "The rise of the global computer network is destroying the link between geographical location and ... the ability of physical
location to give notice of which sets of rules apply." Id. at 1370. See Brill, supra note 8, at
10.
174. See generally CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257; Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 1119; Bensusan, 937
F. Supp. 295; Hearst, 1997 WL 97097 (explaining that the additional activity standard is
necessary for Internet contacts). But see infra notes 194-277 and accompanying text for a
discussion on Inset Systems, Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc. and Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc.,
two cases subject to dispute in this article.
175. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
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establishing channels for providing regular advice to customers in the
forum State, or marketing the product through a distributor
who has
1 76
agreed to serve as the sales agent in the forum State.
Again, Asahi is in the context of product liability stream of commerce, where today's technological world is faced with the question of
what "additional activity" constitutes for Internet stream of commerce. 17 7 To illustrate the confusion that may arise in the minds of
many unacquainted with the Internet, consider O'Connor's example of
78
advertising as additional activity.1
In a products liability stream of commerce, a defendant who advertises in a particular forum is given notice that the defendant is suscepti-

ble to the laws of that forum when the defendant has consciously sought
to advertise there. 179 In the case of Internet stream of commerce, the
defendant does not have notice of which forum it has advertised due to
the Internet's instantaneous world-wide nature without physical boundaries.18 0 Thus, in instances of advertising, additional activity in product
liability stream of commerce cases have shown to provide a different re18
sult than in the Internet's stream of commerce cases. '
Currently, personal jurisdiction disputes with minimum contacts
limited to a Web site on the Internet have made distinctions as to what
82
type of additional activity will avail a defendant of a forum's laws.'
For example, in Zippo, the court distinguished Web sites as being either
interactive or passive.' 8 3 An interactive Web site will usually provide
176. Id.
177. See generally CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257 (finding that a shareware contract over
the Internet was additional activity, and thus met the minimum contacts analysis); Zippo,
952 F. Supp. 1119 (finding that contracts made over the Internet between Internet users
and Zippo Dot Corn to use Zippo's Web site news service was additional activity, and thus
met the minimum contacts analysis); Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. 295 (finding that simply
maintaining a Web site on the Internet, though it may have infringing material, is not
enough to satisfy minimum contacts); Hearst, 1997 WL 97097(finding that a Web site that
has information for a future Web site service and that invites Internet user's to e-mail Web
site owner for more information is not enough additional activity to establish minimum
contacts).
178. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 and the above quote in the text from Justice O'Connor's
opinion.
179. Id.
180. See Johnson & Post, supra note 173, at 1370-76.
181. E.g., Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *10-12 (finding that "a Web site is most analogous
to an advertisement in a national magazine" and thus, does not satisfy minimum contacts
because it may be viewed in all states and is not targeted solely to the residents of a particular state).
182. See, e.g., Zippo, 952 F. Supp. 1119; Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *9-20.
183. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124. "[O]ur review of the available [Internet] cases and
materials reveals that the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet." Id.
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some type of service that involves "repeated transmission of computer
files over the Internet," and may require an Internet user to enter into a
contract.' 8 4 A passive Web site will merely advertise or display informa8 5
tion which can be accessed by Internet users in foreign jurisdictions.1
The interactive Web site that is found to infringe on another will usually
satisfy the minimum contacts analysis, where the passive Web site will
not meet the minimum contacts requirement.' 8 6 Essentially, an interactive Web site is one that provides additional activity while a passive Web
site does not show additional activity, and thus does not meet the minimum contacts requirement.
In the Internet cases of CompuServe and Zippo, the court found additional activity by finding that the defendants had entered into contracts over the Internet. i8 7 In addition, in Bensusan and Hearst, the
court found no Internet contracts and found no additional activity beyond posting material on a Web site.1 88 Although the posted Web site
material may have infringed on the rights of others, the posting was passive without additional activity, and thus there was no notice to the defendant due to the Internet's world-wide nature of no physical
8 9
boundaries.'
The more ambiguous concern is the "middle ground" type of activity
between a passive Web site and an interactive Web site.190 In Zippo, the
court states: "The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites
where a user can exchange information with the host computer. 19 1 In
these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the
level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site."192 Various courts and commentators
have drawn the line differently for this "middle ground," as to what additional activity will be necessary to provide a court with personal jurisdiction. 193 Below, consider the analysis of Internet cases that held for
personal jurisdiction where the additional activity sits in the middle
ground, and how the cases contradict other court's conclusions.

184. Id.

185. Id. "A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to
those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction." Id.
186. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
187. Supra note 177.
188. Supra note 177.

189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

See Johnson & Post, supra note 173, at 1370-76.
Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. THE LimiTs OF ADDITIONAL ACTIVITY: A CASE ANALYSIS
1. Inset Systems v. Instruction Set
Another case dealing with minimum contacts on the Internet is Inset
Systems v. Instruction Set. 19 4 Inset Systems ("Inset") is based in Connecticut and develops and markets its own software product.' 95 Instruction Set ("Instruction") is based in Massachusetts and is a provider of
computer technology. 196 Both corporations provide their services
throughout the world, 19 7 however, Instruction does not conduct business
or have any employees in Connecticut. 198 The only contact Instruction
has with Connecticut is through its Web site on the Internet. 1 99
This suit ensued after Inset attempted to register its federal trademark INSET as a domain name, and learned that Instruction had already obtained inset.com as a domain name. 20 0 Inset brought an action
against Instruction in Connecticut for trademark infringement due to Instruction's advertising in Connecticut over the Internet using the domain
name inset.com.2 0 1 Instruction filed a motion for lack of personal jurisdiction, and the court held for personal jurisdiction by analyzing
the
20 2
state's long-arm statute and the minimum contacts requirement.
The court reasoned that both the state's long-arm statute and minimum contacts were satisfied because of Instruction's Web site that was
available in Connecticut. 20 3 Instruction's Web site advertised its business and included the telephone number 1-800-US-INSET to solicit customers, which was located by using the inset.com domain name. 20 4 The
court found that because Instruction "purposefully directed its advertising activities toward the state," Instruction purposefully availed itself of
the forum's laws. 20 5 Further, the court found that finding personal jurisshort traveling disdiction was reasonable in this case because of20the
6
tance between Connecticut and Massachusetts.
194. Inset Systems, Inc., v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. Conn. 1996).
195. Id. at 162.
196. Id.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
Id.
See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 164-65.
See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 163, 165.
Id. at 165.
Id.
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a. Problems with the Inset Decision
The problem with the Inset decision is that Instruction's Web site is
passive just as the Web sites in question in Bensusan and Hearst,which
held personal jurisdiction was not proper.20 7 A passive Web site is one
that merely advertises or displays information which can be accessed by
Internet users in foreign jurisdictions. 20 8 Conversely, an interactive
Web site is one that will usually provide some type of service that involves "repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet," and
may require an Internet user to enter into a contract. 20 9 In Inset, Instruction's Web site does not promote additional activity such as entering a contract over the Internet, nor does the Web site transmit
computer fies or provide a service over the Internet. 2 10 The Web site
merely advertises information to promote sales for Instruction, and is
thus passive. 2 1 1 Thus, the court should not have held for personal jurisdiction over Instruction because the Web site is passive and the only contact with Connecticut's forum.
The court's reasoning that personal jurisdiction was reasonable because of the short distance between Massachusetts and Connecticut is
misplaced. 2 12 The court's reasoning is misplaced because the court con2 13
ferred personal jurisdiction due to Instruction's passive Web site.
Again, a passive Web site merely displays information for Internet users
to view. 2 14 Furthermore, the Web site is available to every Internet user
in the world. Thus, because a passive Web site is not considered additional activity within a forum, the court's reasoning is misplaced for finding personal jurisdiction reasonable.
b. Additional Activity found in the Inset decision
Instruction's additional activity is limited to Instruction advertising
207. Bensusan, 937 F. Supp. at 300; Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *20 (finding that the

Web sites in question were passive, and that to hold for personal jurisdiction there needs to
be additional activity or an interactive Web site).
208. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
209. Id.
210. See Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 165 (finding that a Web site that advertises displaying a
toll free telephone number on a Web site, and that is available on the Internet, not only to
Connecticut residents but to all states, will satisfy the purposeful availment requirement).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. "[F]air play and substantial justice may defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction even if the defendant has the requisite minimum contacts with the forum. However,
where minimum contacts have been established the defendant must present a compelling
case that the presence of some other considerations would render jurisdiction unreasonable." Id.
214. Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
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and soliciting business on its Web site.2 15 Instruction advertises over
the Internet by posting information about Instruction's business that includes a toll-free telephone number with the claimed infringing name
INSET in the number. 2 16 Similarly, in Hearst, the defendant used its
Web site for advertising and included in the Web site an e-mail address
for those interested in the defendant's future services, where the e-mail
address included the claimed infringing name.2 17 The court in Hearst
would not allow personal jurisdiction over the defendant, holding that
this "would, in effect, create national (or even worldwide) jurisdiction, so
that every plaintiff could sue in plaintiffs home court every out-of-state
defendant who established an Internet [Wleb site."2 18 Although the defendant in Hearst was advertising on the Internet, the court in Hearst
did not see the type of advertising on the Internet as the type to purposefully avail a defendant to a forum's laws. 2 19 Rather, the Hearst court
stated that advertising on the Internet "may be viewed by people in all
fifty states (and all over the world too for that matter), but it [the advertising] is not targeted toward the residents of New York or any other
22 0
particular state."
In Inset, Instruction is comparable to the defendant in Hearst,where
Instruction's Web site advertisement did not avail Instruction to the particular forum of Connecticut because of the Internet's world-wide nature.
Under O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, the additional activity required is
activity that puts the defendant on notice that the defendant is susceptible to a particular forum's laws. 22 1 If the Inset court had followed

O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, the court likely would have held differently
by finding that Instruction's advertising through its Web site is not
targeted particularly to the residents of Connecticut. Thus, by following
the O'Connor opinion, advertising on a Web site does not meet the requisite additional activity for minimum contacts because of the world-wide
nature of the Internet.
2. Maritz v. Cybergold
22 2
Comparable to the court in Inset, the court in Maritz v. Cybergold
did not follow either CompuServe or O'Connor's opinion in Asahi.
Rather, the Maritz court followed the Inset decision to strengthen its

215. Inset, 937 F. Supp. at 164.
216. Id. at 163.
217. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *4.
218. Id. at *20.
219. Id. at *10.
220. Id.
221. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
222. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. 1328 (holding that personal jurisdiction is proper when the
minimum contacts are limited to a Web site).
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case for minimum contacts that are limited to a Web site. 22 3 If the

Maritz court had considered posting information on the Internet as similar to placing a product in the stream of commerce under CompuServe,22 4 the Maritz decision would likely have reached a different
result.
In Maritz, the defendant Cybergold, a corporation located in Berkeley, California, was offering a future e-mail service on its Web site, maintained through a server located in California. 2 25 The Web site
advertised Cybergold's future e-mail service and invited visitors of the
Web site to sign up on a mailing list for its future service. The plaintiff
Maritz is a corporation located in Missouri that provides an e-mail service under its trademark name GOLDMAIL. 22 6 When Maritz sued
Cybergold in Missouri with the claim of trademark infringement,
Cybergold moved for a 12(b)(2) motion for lack of personal jurisdiction.2 27 The court in Maritz ruled for personal jurisdiction by applying
228
the minimum contacts test.
a. Problems with the Maritz Decision
i. "Quality and nature" and "quantity"of the contacts
First, the court considered the "quality and nature" and "quantity" of
Cybergold's contacts. 2 29 The court found that Cybergold's contacts were
solely through the maintenance of Cybergold's Web site. 230 By accessing
Cybergold's Web site, the Internet user could choose to receive
Cybergold's future e-mail service by signing themselves to a mailing
2

list. 31 Further, the court reasoned that because Cybergold knew that

its Web site could reach Internet users in Missouri as well as globally,
Cybergold's contacts met the "quality and nature" and "quantity" of the
2 32
contacts to satisfy personal jurisdiction.
A problem with the Maritz ruling is that the court followed the Inset
court's reasoning for finding minimum contacts. 23 3 Accordingly, the
223. Id. at 1334.
224. See, e.g., supra note 132 comparing the placement of a Web site on the Internet to a
product being placed into the stream of commerce.
225. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330.
226. Id. at 1336.
227. Id. at 1329.
228. Id. at 1334. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for minimum contacts
analysis.
229. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333. See Hanson v. Denckla 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)
(discussing the direct relationship between the purposeful availment requirement with the
"quality and nature" of the minimum contacts).
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1333-34.
232. Id. at 1334.
233. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1334.
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Maritz court compared its facts to Inset 23 4 and used similar reasoning

that, because Cybergold knew its Web site would advertise to Internet
users in Missouri and on a global level, Cybergold's contacts purposefully

avail Cybergold to Missouri's laws. 23 5 Rather, if the Maritz court had

followed O'Connor's opinion in Asahi,2 36 the Maritz court would have focused on the additional activity of Cybergold that was particular to Missouri residents. 23 7 Although the court did recognize that Cybergold's
Web site was not completely passive, i.e., the mailing list,23 8 the court

focused on the Web site's ability to advertise and continuously reach Internet users globally. 23 9 Because of the world-wide nature of the Internet, the additional activity is the key element to analyze minimum
contacts. 2 40 Thus, by following the additional activity analysis for Internet cases, as instituted by Justice O'Connor in Asahi, courts will focus
on the key elements of whether a defendant purposefully avails himself
to a particular forum.
ii. Cause of action arisingfrom "activities"within the forum
The court considered whether the cause of action arose from
Cybergold's Web site activities in Missouri. 2 4 1 The court reasoned that

the promotional efforts of Cybergold's future e-mail service through
Cybergold's Web site was part of the claimed infringement of Cybergold's
trademark. 2 42 Further, the court reasoned that, although the service
was not yet operational, Cybergold's development of a mailing list was
also part of the claimed infringement in Missouri. 2 43 Thus, the court
ruled that Cybergold's Web site activities with Missouri resulted in
244
Maritz's cause of action.
Again, the court's decision that Maritz's claim arose from
Cybergold's action within Missouri is misplaced because the Maritz court
misplaces the nature of a Web site being felt world-wide. 24 5 For example, the Maritz court has failed to distinguish that the Internet activities
must be directed solely to Missouri instead of generally by Cybergold's
234. Id.
235. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
236. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.

237. Maritz, F. Supp. at 1330. "Plaintiff asserts that the website 'invites Missourians to
put their names on Cybergold's mailing list and get up-to-date information about the company and its forthcoming Internet service.'" Id.
238. Id. at 1333.
239. Id.
240. Supra note 177.
241. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1333-34.
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Web site because of the world-wide nature of a Web site. If the Martiz
court had followed O'Connor's opinion in Asahi that requires additional
activity, 2 46 then the Maritz court would have focused on Cybergold's additional activities directed specifically to Missouri that caused the alleged claim. Thus, because of the world-wide nature of the Internet,
O'Connor's opinion in Asahi that requires an analysis of additional contacts is best suited when determining minimum contacts on the Internet.
iii. "TraditionalNotions of FairPlay and Substantial Justice"
Finally, the court concluded that "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice" was not violated by exercising personal jurisdiction
over Cybergold. 2 4 7 The court found that Maritz's trademark interest was
substantial and that Cybergold's actions of purposeful availment to the
Missouri forum did not violate due process. 248 Thus, the court found
2 49
that personal jurisdiction was proper.
In Maritz, the court found that the "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice" standard was satisfied partly because it found
that Cybergold's Web site constituted purposeful availment. 2 50 However, the purposeful availment requirement was found by the Maritz
court without following O'Connor's opinion in Asahi that requires additional activity directed to the forum state. Rather, the Maritz court followed the Inset court's decision. 2 5 1 By separating the additional activity
toward the forum state from the Internet's stream of commerce contact
that is felt world-wide, a better analysis can be made of whether a defendant has purposefully availed itself to a forum's laws. 2 5 2 Thus, when
a better analysis is made for purposeful availment with Internet contacts, then the standard of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" is better applied when determining minimum contacts that
are limited to a Web site.
b. Additional Activity found in the Maritz decision
The difference between an interactive Web site and a passive Web
site is essentially what this comment has termed "additional activity,"
where the defendant takes action that is specifically directed to a forum
while on the Internet. The degree of action over the Internet that makes
a defendant susceptible to a forums laws depends on the "nature and
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1334.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Supra note 177.
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quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet."25 3 In Maritz, Cybergold's additional activity is limited to
Cybergold advertising and soliciting its future e-mail service on its Web
site, where the Web site invites visitors to sign up on an e-mail mailing
25 4
list to receive updates on the progress of the future e-mail service.
Thus, the additional activity at issue is a Web site that advertises and
solicits an e-mail mailing list, where Cybergold is sending updates of his
future service to those on the mailing list.
Similarly, in Hearst,the defendant used its Web site for advertising
the defendant's future service, where the defendant received and sent email messages with the forum state. 25 5 In Hearst, the court addressed
whether the Web site activity of advertising, e-mail messages, and solic2 56
iting were sufficient to satisfy minimum contacts.
First, the court considered a Web site "analogous to an advertisement in a national magazine," stating that a Web site is viewed by people
world-wide, but is not targeted to a particular state. 25 7 Because the Web
site is not targeted to a particular state, a Web site, like a national maga258
zine, is not sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction.
Second, the court in Hearst discussed the applicability of e-mail
messages as satisfying minimum contacts. 2 59 In Hearst, the defendant's
e-mail messages were sent subsequent to the plaintiff filing the complaint, however, the court still addressed whether the e-mail messages
were adequate to satisfy minimum contacts. 260 The court considered the
e-mail messages analogous to telephone or letter communications, finding that communications of this type "are not sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under.., the due process clause." 2 6 1 The court stated
neither the defendant's Web site, "which is the equivalent of an advertisement in a national publication, nor his e-mails, which are equivalent
to letters or telephone calls, are sufficient to provide this Court with per26 2
sonal jurisdiction over [the defendant]."
Moreover, the court in Hearst considered whether the type of soliciting on a Web site where no product or service is sold would confer personal jurisdiction, where the commercial transaction type of soliciting is
completely different. Because the court in Hearst did not yet have a
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1124.
Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330.
Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *4-5.
Id. at *10-15.
Id. at *10.
Id.
Id. at *12-13.
Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *12.
Id. at *12.
Id. at *13.
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product or service to sell, 2 63 the court stated that conferring personal
jurisdiction for soliciting of this type on a Web site would "offend traditional notions of fair play, because it would lead to nationwide jurisdiction over the Internet."2 64 Web sites by their nature are inherently by
and large advertisements and a type of solicitation. Thus, if a court
holds that advertising or the non-commercial type of soliciting on a Web
site will satisfy minimum contacts, then the Web site's nature of being
an advertisement or a non-commercial solicitation will lead to nationwide jurisdiction.
In Maritz, Cybergold is comparable to the defendant's Web site in
Hearst. Cybergold's Web site advertises and is set up to receive an e-mail
mailing list for its future service, 26 5 where the defendant in Hearst is
also set up to receive e-mail from those interested in the future service. 26 6 Further, Cybergold's non-commercial soliciting is similar to the
defendant in Hearst because Cybergold's service is not yet operational
and has not yet sold a product or service. 2 67 Thus, the facts in Maritz
and Hearst are similar.
Although the facts in Maritz and Hearstare similar, the courts came
to different conclusions: where the Maritz court held for personal jurisdiction, 26 8 the Hearst court did not. 2 69 The reason for this fundamental
difference is the courts' reasoning. The Maritz court held for personal
jurisdiction by applying the traditional minimum contacts standard
without considering the implications of its holding that "would, in effect,
create national (or even worldwide) jurisdiction."2 70 In contrast, the
Hearst court recognized the world-wide nature of the Internet by following the O'Connor standard in Asahi that requires additional activity for
stream of commerce contacts. 27 1 Thus, although the facts in Maritz and
Hearst are similar, the different standard used in Maritz as opposed to
Hearst for minimum contacts explains the different rulings.
By following O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, the focus to determine if
the defendant has purposefully availed himself to a forum is based on the
additional activity toward that forum, 2 72 rather than accepting the Internet's stream of commerce contact that is world-wide as adequate. Ac263. Id. at *15.

264. Id.
265. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330.
266. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *4.
267. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330; Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *4.
268. Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1337.
269. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *21.
270. Id. at *20.
271. See id. at *15-16 (following Bensusan's reasoning of requiring additional conduct
under O'Connor's opinion in Asahi).
272. Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
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cordingly, the Maritz court would likely have considered Cybergold's
Web site that was set up to receive an e-mail mailing list for its future
service as insufficient to establish minimum contacts. The e-mail mailing list did not form an Internet contract 273 nor was any service or product sold because the service was not yet available. 2 74 Further, e-mail's
have been analogized as mere phone and letter communications which is
not enough to confer jurisdiction. 2 75 Essentially, Cybergold's contact
with Missouri residents is limited to the Web site's e-mail mailing list for
its future service. 27 6 An e-mail mailing list to receive updates for a service that is not yet operational does not show the type of commercial
activity that will confer personal jurisdiction because there was not yet a
commercial transaction. Because the Martiz court did not follow
O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, the court was not able to focus properly on
the proper Internet contacts that were directed toward the forum state,
and then determine the level of commercial activity of those contacts.
Thus, by applying O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, focus can be made upon
the type of additional activity that is directed to a forum state beyond the
2 77
stream of commerce contact.
C.

POTENTIAL EFFECTS ON THE INTERNET'S FUTURE

Decisions like Inset and Maritz could have negative implications on
the Internet's technological progress. 2 78 Courts that hold that Web site
advertising and soliciting satisfy minimum contacts, "in effect, create national (or even world-wide) jurisdiction" 2 79 because of the world-wide nature of the Internet. Because of this result, the liability of Internet users
28 1
would hinder Internet development. 280 Furthermore, due process
273. Supra note 177.
274. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1330 (discussing Cybergold's service that is not yet
operational).
275. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *12.
276. See Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1333 (describing Cybergold's Web site as one that
"seeks to develop a mailing list of Internet users").
277. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (discussing how the additional conduct is the inquiry for
a stream of commerce minimum contacts analysis).
278. See generally MooRF, supra note 4, at 51 (discussing the purpose of the National
Information Infrastructure ("NIl") and the projected future of the Internet). The NII's purpose is to make the Internet available to everyone. Id. Furthermore, the Internet has become the testing ground for new ideas and new technologies. Id. Although the Internet is
not part of the NII, the future of the Internet is predicted to be "supported by the giant
telecommunications' firms of the United States." Id. However, the low cost of the Internet,
that is making the Internet so readily available to everyone, is predicted to increase in cost
as the unstable commercial world becomes a large part of the Internet. Id.
279. Hearst, 1997 WL 97097, at *20.
280. See generally MooRE, supra note 4, at 50 (discussing the low cost of the Internet as
a means for the Internet being widely available to everyone). Although Internet user costs
are low, the cost will increase as the Internet is effected by the commercial world. Id.

1997]

PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN CYBERSPACE

could hardly be served if each state can exercise personal jurisdiction 28 2
over an Internet user who maintains a Web site. 28 3 Thus, if Inset and
Maritz are followed by other courts, the result can open Internet users to
lawsuits on a national or possibly an international level.
In contrast, if courts follow O'Connor's opinion in Asahi of requiring
additional activity by considering Web sites as either interactive or passive, 28 4 the effects on the Internet's growth will be well served. Instead
of being bombarded by Internet lawsuits, courts will have increased control over what type of Internet lawsuits are susceptible to personal jurisdiction. Moreover, the Due Process Clause will be satisfied under the
minimum contacts analysis. Importantly, technology on the Internet
will continue to develop and grow.
By applying the CompuServe decision and O'Connor's opinion in
Asahi, a framework for personal jurisdiction in the cyberspace regime is
established. CompuServe's minimum contacts analysis provides the necessities for proper application to the cyberspace regime while maintaining flexibility of the test. 28 5 Furthermore, O'Connor's opinion in Asahi

on the "stream of commerce" provides an analogy for the nature of a Web
site compared to a "product placed into the stream of commerce." 28 6
Thus, when courts view a Web site as similar to a product placed in the
281. See supra note 23 explaining the Due Process Clause as contained in the U.S.
Constitution.
282. See Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Geographyas a Litigation Weapon: Consumers,ForumSelection Clauses, and the Rehnquist Court, 40 UCLA L. REv. 423, 460 (1992) (analyzing
the limits of the state power to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
under the minimum contacts test).
283. McDonough v. Fallon McElligott, Inc., No. 95-4037, 1996 WL 753991, at *3 (S.D.
Cal. filed Aug. 5, 1996). The court held on the Internet issue: "Because the Web enables
easy world-wide access, allowing computer interaction via the Web to supply sufficient contacts to establish jurisdiction would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement as it
currently exist; the Court is not willing to take this step." Id. In McDonough, Fallon McElligott is an advertising corporation in Minnesota while McDonough resides in California.
Id. at *1.McDonough claims that Fallon infringed McDonough's copyrighted photograph
creation of Charles Barkley. Id. McDonough is suing Fallon for the alleged copyright infringement in the Southern District of California. Id. The court discusses whether Fallon
had any contacts with the State of California to satisfy the minimum contacts test. McDonough, 1996 WL 753991, at *2-3. The court found that Fallon's contacts with California
were insufficient. Id. at *6. The court held that Fallon has had almost no contact with the
state of California relating to this action, and litigating the matter in California would be
inefficient and unfair. Id. at *6.
284. See supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text discussing the stream of commerce
analogy.
285. See supra notes 91-95 and accompanying text discussing the factors necessary to
find minimum contacts limited to the Internet.
286. See supra notes 63, and 153-62 and accompanying text discussing the stream of
commerce analogy with a Web site. E.g., supra note 132 and accompanying text for the
nature of a Web site in the stream of commerce.
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stream of commerce, under O'Connor's opinion in Asahi, then personal
28 7
jurisdiction can easily be applied to the cyberspace regime.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This comment argues to follow the more restrictive view of minimum
contacts dealing with the stream of commerce, instituted by Justice
O'Connor in Asahi,28 8 as applied to Internet cases illustrated in the
CompuServe,28 9 Bensusan, Zippo, and Hearstdecisions. These decisions
have illustrated the difference between interactive and passive activity
on the Internet. While some courts have held for personal jurisdiction
where the minimum contacts are limited to a passive Web site. 29 0 Other
courts have held this "would eviscerate the personal jurisdiction requirement" as it exists today by denying due process. 29 1 As a standard, due
process is better served by applying O'Connor's opinion in Asahi for
cyberspace contacts.
In Inset and Maritz, the courts failed to apply O'Connor's opinion in
Asahi to determine minimum contacts. Because of the nature of a Web
site, the Inset and Maritz holding results in a forfeiture of due process.
Thus, the courts must apply the O'Connor opinion in Asahi to maintain
due process rights for those who conduct activities on the Internet.
We must understand that cyberspace is everywhere, just as a product being placed in the stream of commerce can be felt nationwide.
When a court misapplies personal jurisdiction in cyberspace, the court
subjects Internet users to nationwide or even international jurisdiction.
However, if O'Connor's opinion in Asahi is applied to determine minimum contacts, then limits are placed on personal jurisdiction forums and
due process will be satisfied.
David L. Stott

287. See supra note 50 and accompanying text discussing the importance on properly
integrating the Internet with personal jurisdiction.

288.
289.
290.
291.

Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112.
CompuServe, 89 F.3d 1257.
Maritz, 947 F. Supp. at 1337.
McDonough, 1996 WL 753991.

